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Abstract
Collaborative models (e.g., wikis) are an increasingly prevalent Web technology. However, the open-access
that defines such systems can also be utilized for nefarious purposes. In particular, this paper examines the use
of collaborative functionality to add inappropriate hyperlinks to destinations outside the host environment
(i.e., link spam). The collaborative encyclopedia, Wikipedia, is the basis for our analysis.
Recent research has exposed vulnerabilities in Wikipedia's link spam mitigation, finding that human editors
are latent and dwindling in quantity. To this end, we propose and develop an autonomous classifier for link
additions. Such a system presents unique challenges. For example, low barriers-to-entry invite a diversity of
spam types, not just those with economic motivations. Moreover, issues can arise with how a link is presented
(regardless of the destination).
In this work, a spam corpus is extracted from over 235,000 link additions to English Wikipedia. From this,
40+ features are codified and analyzed. These indicators are computed using "wiki" metadata, landing site
analysis, and external data sources. The resulting classifier attains 64% recall at 0.5% false-positives (ROC-
AUC=0.97). Such performance could enable egregious link additions to be blocked automatically with low
false-positive rates, while prioritizing the remainder for human inspection. Finally, a live Wikipedia
implementation of the technique has been developed.
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ABSTRACT
Collaborative models (e.g., wikis) are an increasingly preva-
lent Web technology. However, the open-access that defines
such systems can also be utilized for nefarious purposes.
In particular, this paper examines the use of collaborative
functionality to add inappropriate hyperlinks to destinations
outside the host environment (i.e., link spam). The collabo-
rative encyclopedia, Wikipedia, is the basis for our analysis.
Recent research has exposed vulnerabilities in Wikipedia’s
link spam mitigation, finding that human editors are latent
and dwindling in quantity. To this end, we propose and de-
velop an autonomous classifier for link additions. Such a sys-
tem presents unique challenges. For example, low barriers-
to-entry invite a diversity of spam types, not just those with
economic motivations. Moreover, issues can arise with how
a link is presented (regardless of the destination).
In this work, a spam corpus is extracted from over 235,000
link additions to English Wikipedia. From this, 40+ features
are codified and analyzed. These indicators are computed
using wikimetadata, landing site analysis, and external data
sources. The resulting classifier attains 64% recall at 0.5%
false-positives (ROC-AUC= 0.97). Such performance could
enable egregious link additions to be blocked automatically
with low false-positive rates, while prioritizing the remainder
for human inspection. Finally, a live Wikipedia implemen-
tation of the technique has been developed.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.3 [Group and Organization Interfaces]: collabora-
tive computing, computer-supported cooperative work ;
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
Keywords
Wikipedia, collaboration, collaborative security, information
security, link spam, spam mitigation, reputation, spatio-
temporal features, machine-learning, intelligent routing.
1. INTRODUCTION
As of this writing, six of the Internet’s ten most-trafficked
sites depend heavily on collaborative or user-generated con-
tent [2]. For example, the collaborative encyclopedia, Wiki-
pedia [9], received over 88 billion page views last year to
its English edition [15]. Such cooperative environments are
unique in that end-users can add to, and sometimes modify,
others’ content. Additionally, such systems often encourage
participation via intentionally minimal barriers-to-entry.
Unsurprisingly, malicious users see these characteristics as
an asset: open-access permissions allow attacks to be carried
out at low marginal cost, and those attacks have the poten-
tial to reach a large number of viewers. The malicious use on
which this paper is focused is link spamming, the insertion of
inappropriate hyperlinks (often to selfish ends). The perva-
siveness and detection of such behavior has been the subject
of recent research as it pertains to social networks [22] and
forum/blog comments [16, 25, 30, 37].
However, little link spam research has been done in purely
collaborative settings, such as Wikipedia (the focus of this
writing). Most applications are only partially collaborative
because of constraints on the editing model. For example,
social networks often provide only local (peer-group) ac-
cess. Similarly, blogs/forums are generally append-only in
nature. Without these constraints, wiki environments could
be among the most attractive to link spam attackers.
Despite having extensive anti-spam infrastructure [41], re-
cent research confirms Wikipedia’s vulnerability. The ency-
clopedia’s primary weakness appears to be its reliance on
human-driven link spam mitigation. Our prior work [41]
suggests attack vectors to exploit human detection latency,
showing it feasible to conduct profitable link spam cam-
paigns. Similarly, Goldman [23] observes that a shrink-
ing editor/administrative population and growing reader-
ship may make Wikipedia a more viable target. Finally, [37]
indicates human protections may be insufficient against
mechanized and increasingly intelligent blackhat software.
Addressing these shortcomings, this work proposes an au-
tonomous classifier for link additions in purely collaborative
environments. To create the classifier, a corpus was parsed
from over 235,000 link additions to English Wikipedia. For
each link added, we collected: (1) Wikipedia metadata (ar-
ticle, editor, etc.), (2) source code of the document being
linked, and (3) third-party data about the URL (malware
status, web statistics). These links were then labeled (spam
or ham) using the implicit actions of Wikipedia experts.
This corpus was then used to identify features indicative of
spam behavior, emphasizing those aspects unique to purely
collaborative settings. Here, we identify, describe, and pro-
vide an intuitive basis for over 40 such features. Then, a
classifier built from these is evaluated using cross-validation.
We find that the model is capable of detecting 64% of
spam links with 0.5% false-positives. Such performance lags
considerably behind that seen in other anti-spam domains
(i.e., email) and speaks to the difficulty of the task. How-
ever, some quantity of link spam can certainly be blocked
autonomously. Beyond that, classification scores can help
prioritize the manual efforts of anti-spam defenders; a vast
improvement over the brute-force strategies currently em-
ployed. The proposed system has the potential to be an
asset not just for the health and survival of Wikipedia, but
to the collaborative paradigm as a whole.
The novel contributions of this work are four-fold:
1. Identification of link spam detection features unique to
purely collaborative environments (i.e.,wikis).
2. Evaluation of link spam features found useful in par-
tially collaborative settings (e.g., blogs, UGC sites), in
a purely collaborative environment.
3. Establishment of a corpus and performance baseline
for link spam detection on which future work can build.
4. Implementation of our technique in a live setting, to
the benefit of a user community.
This paper proceeds as follows: First, Wikipedia funda-
mentals are covered (Sec. 2) prior to discussing related work
(Sec. 3). Then, a corpus is created (Sec. 4), features ex-
tracted (Sec. 5), and the resulting model evaluated (Sec. 6).
Next, our practical live implementation is discussed (Sec. 7),
before discussing evasion/gamesmanship strategies (Sec. 8).
Finally, concluding remarks are made (Sec. 9).
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, preliminaries for the remainder of this
work are established. First, general terminology is discussed
(Sec. 2.1), before covering those aspects specific to link spam
(Sec. 2.2). Then, the status quo defenses Wikipedia employs
against link spammers are examined (Sec. 2.3).
2.1 Terminology
Wikipedia [9] is a collaborative encyclopedia consisting of
many articles1. Each article consists of a version history,
H = {r0, r1, r2, . . .}, where r0 is an empty version. One cre-
ates a new version by performing an edit or revision, and
these are most often visualized by computing the diff be-
tween rn−1 and rn. When a new version, rn, duplicates the
content of a previous one, ri,i<n, it is termed a revert or
undo. Reverts are of interest because they are often used to
correct damaging contributions.
Those who make edits are termed editors or contributors.
Taken as a whole, the user-base is often called a community.
Contributors can edit anonymously with no barrier-to-entry,
or become registered and have persistent credentials.
Articles on Wikipedia are inter-connected using hyper-
links. When an article references another (internal) article,
this is termed a wikilink. When the reference points outside
the encyclopedia, it is an external link. A syntax defines how
external links are created [11], and this writing concerns it-
self only with well-formed links of this kind.
1While discussion is Wikipedia specific, these concepts apply
broadly to all collaborative applications.
2.2 Defining Link Spam
Put simply, any external link that violates Wikipedia pol-
icy [11] is considered to be link spam2,3. A link can be
inappropriate due to its: (1) destination or (2) presentation.
A link’s destination is the web property to which the link
points, usually an HTML page (also called the landing site).
Links to commercial sites are generally prohibited, as are
those unfit for encyclopedic use (e.g., most blogs, personal
sites, etc.). Presentation concerns itself with on-wiki place-
ment. For example, links must be context appropriate and
the appearance (font, size, etc.) should be according to con-
vention. Those who conduct link spam are termed spam-
mers. However, it should be emphasized that not all uncon-
structive additions are made with malicious intent.
Making a spam/ham distinction is no trivial task, espe-
cially given Wikipedia’s subjective policies. Fortunately,
when a corpus is assembled in Sec. 4, Wikipedia experts
are relied upon to perform labeling on a case-by-case basis.
2.3 Wikipedia Anti-Spam
A thorough description of Wikipedia’s anti-spam function-
ality can be found in our prior work [41], which is briefly
summarized here. First, HTML nofollow is applied to all
outgoing links. Thus, Wikipedia cannot be used to attain
backlinks for search-engine optimization (SEO) purposes.
Instead, spammers must solicit direct traffic to obtain utility
from the links they place (i.e., via click-throughs).
Evidence suggests that the majority of spam links are dis-
covered using brute-force patrolling strategies, where human
users manually inspect link additions. Simple systems as-
sist patrollers in this task. For example, an IRC channel
reports link additions and another tool provides aggregate
link information (e.g., all the articles in which some URL
appears) [14]. Additional functionality targets systematic
abuse (a URL blacklist [13], anti-bot extensions [8], etc.)
Assuming a URL does not have an abusive history (trig-
gering systematic protections), all anti-spam efforts are mit-
igative – being applied after the link has gone live. Thus,
there is an inherent latency between the insertion of a spam
link and its removal. Since practically all of these efforts are
human-driven, such latencies can be lengthy, and spammers
can harness these windows of opportunity [41].
The proposal of this paper is a preventative system which
is brought to bear immediately on link additions. Egregious
contributions can be undone4 without human intervention
(as false-positive tolerances permit). Beyond that, classifica-
tion scores can be used to prioritize the efforts of patrollers,
minimizing their latency (relative to random search).
3. RELATED WORK
Here, related work is surveyed – both Wikipedia specific
(Sec. 3.1) and in alternative collaborative settings (Sec. 3.2).
2Other forms of Wikipedia spam exist. For example, entire ar-
ticles could be created to advertise some product/service. These
alternative forms are not considered in this writing.
3This definition of “link spam” is broader than that in other do-
mains (e.g., blog comments). However, all inappropriate links are
“undesirable traffic” from Wikipedia’s perspective, so we believe
the “spam” terminology is appropriate.
4Since our tool will not be integrated into the wiki software di-
rectly, it cannot block link spam. Instead, it will actually revert
live links. However, the tool’s speed will make this distinction
irrelevant, and therefore it is a de facto preventative system.
3.1 Wikipedia Specific
On Wikipedia, link spam is a subset of vandalism, a term
describing all unconstructive edits. Much research has ex-
amined vandalism and its detection [17, 34, 35]. This in-
cludes bots operating autonomously [18] and user-driven in-
telligent routing tools that assist patrollers [6, 40].
However, most vandalism is not spam [35], and thus the
aforementioned tools are not specifically designed to detect
it. Quite the opposite, most vandalism is offensive or non-
sensical [35], leading to the heavy use of natural-language
processing (NLP) in the development of detection schemes.
While it seems unlikely that a spammer trying to garner
traffic would engage in such language patterns, this writing
still builds on anti-vandalism work. For example, metadata
and reputation features [17, 42] can be used agnostic of the
content type. This work examines how such features perform
when used exclusively for link spam detection (Sec. 5.1).
Furthermore, an anti-vandalism GUI tool [40] is repurposed
for use by link spam patrollers (Sec. 7.3).
While link spam may not be the most common form of
vandalism currently, recent work [23, 41] has suggested vul-
nerabilities. Spammers may be likely to exploit these weak-
nesses given their well-incentivized nature. We presume link
spammers aim to profit from their actions (be it financial or
simply narcissistic). Therefore, they should be motivated to
avoid detection and actively evade protections (Sec. 8).
Our prior work [41] was the first to examine Wikipedia
link spam in-depth. After showing that status quo spam
behaviors on Wikipedia were inefficient, we proposed a novel
and aggressive attack model which estimation showed could
be carried out at profit. The viability of such an attack
was a primary motivator of this work. The efforts herein
construct a similar corpus (Sec. 4), but use it to identify
features indicative of spamming behaviors (Sec. 5). Our
approach intends to detect both status quo spam strategies
(as of this writing, an annoying, but non-pervasive issue) and
those more aggressive proposals of our earlier work5 (which
could have more devastating affects if unchecked).
3.2 Alternative Domains
The bulk of research on link spam detection has been per-
formed in domains besides wikis, such as blogs/forums [16,
30] and social networks [22]. Strategies for preventing and
mitigating such spam were broadly surveyed in [27]. This
work examines if these techniques are applicable within the
unique confines of a wiki/Wikipedia environment.
For example, analysis of destination content (i.e., HTML)
is one such strategy, attempting to quantify “commercial
intention” and SEO strategies [19, 31]. Sec. 5.2 examines
how these techniques fare on Wikipedia, where nofollow is
used and most link spam is not commercial in nature [41].
Another oft-proposed technique is semantic NLP analysis,
i.e., measuring how well an addition fits into the context of
existing content [29, 31]. However, such measures may prove
less beneficial on Wikipedia where prior research indicates a
lack of “blanket spamming” [41] and one can easily find an
article relevant to any link destination.
The above evidence suggests there may be difficulty in ap-
plying blog/forum detection techniques6 to Wikipedia. Yet,
5Note that because [41] proposes novel attack vectors, such be-
haviors are not captured in our corpus. Thus, static rules must
be written to prevent spam campaigns of that kind (see Sec. 7.2).
6Two systems believed to be employing such techniques are Ak-
the purely collaborative nature of wikis permits novel fea-
tures not possible in such partially collaborative settings.
For instance, blog comments are typically append-only in
nature, while content can be inserted at arbitrary positions
in wikis. Such Wikipedia-driven features are identified, dis-
cussed, and leveraged in Sec. 5.1.
Recent work [37] also examines blackhat/SEO spamming
software that specifically targets collaborative functionality
(including wikis). That writing proposes that such software
can be detected by packet-level analysis. Not having ac-
cess to Wikipedia’s network traffic flows, we are unable to
quantify the performance of such techniques.
Finally, it deserves mention that Wikipedia anti-spam is
an entirely volunteer effort. In contrast, profit-oriented sites
often employ dedicated individuals to perform content in-
spection [38]. Thus, it seems especially pertinent to opti-
mize what shrinking human resources are available [23], as
our live implementation attempts to do (Sec. 7).
4. SPAM CORPUS
Next, the production of a link spam corpus is discussed.
This required collecting external links added to Wikipedia,
as well as associated data (Sec. 4.1). Then, spam/ham labels
were applied to a subset of these additions (Sec. 4.2).
4.1 Link Collection
Wikipedia link additions were collected in real-time using
an extension to the STiki framework [40]. By examining
every diff to Wikipedia’s article namespace (ignoring user
profiles, discussion pages, etc.), external link additions were
parsed per their syntax [11]. For each link added, data fields
were retrieved and stored at three granularity:
1. Wikipedia: Using [7], all wiki metadata for the link is
stored (editor, article, timestamp, edit summary). The
URL and its hypertext description are also recorded,
along with the full text of the article of appearance.
2. Landing site: Visiting the URL of the external link,
the source code of the destination is obtained.
3. Third-party: Data was obtained about the URL via
the Google Safe-Browsing Project [5, 36] (malware and
phishing lists) and the Alexa Web Information Ser-
vice [3] (whois fields, backlink quantity, etc.)
Data was collected during portions of Feb. and Mar. 2011,
retrieving over 235,000 rows, consuming roughly 20GB of
storage. It should be noted that the fetching/archival of
arbitrary Internet documents does raise certain legal and
ethical issues (e.g., child pornography [43]). On the advice
and approval of our institution’s General Counsel, steps were
taken to avoid acquiring/rendering image content.
4.2 Link Labeling
Having acquired link data, we produce a corpus of labeled
spam/ham entries. The corpus composition is summarized
by Fig. 1. Then, the accuracy and consequences of this
labeling approach are discussed. As a preliminary, only rows
where the destination is an HTML document are considered
(all file types can be handled in practice, see Sec. 7.1). This
filter removed some 50,000 (21%) of rows from eligibility.
ismet [1] and Defensio [4]. These services are closed-source com-
mercial offerings filtering blog comments and other postings. An
exacting comparison is not possible due to their proprietary na-
ture. Our system’s implementation (Sec. 7) is free/open-source.
All links
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Figure 1: Summarizing corpus creation
Labeling Spam Revisions: To find spam edits, we rely
upon a technique developed in prior literature [41, 42]: the
rollback action is an expedited form of revert/undo available
to privileged users. Rollback is only appropriate when un-
doing “blatantly unproductive” contributions, and thus any
edit undone via rollback can be considered vandalism [42].
However, extracting the link spam subset requires addi-
tional work. First, we consider only rolled-back edits where
exactly one link was added. Then, manually inspecting those
diffs, we discard revisions where modifications were made
apart from the link and its immediate supporting context.
The remaining revisions are link spam. Intuitively, we know
these to be link spam edits because the link is the only
change made, and therefore the decision to rollback the edit
speaks directly to the inappropriateness of that one link [41].
Of the 188,210 collected links with HTML destinations,
2,865 (1.5%) were undone via the rollback action. Of these,
1,510 were the only link added in their edit. Finally, 1,095
passed the manual inspection and“no-bot”criteria7, forming
the spam portion of the corpus.
Labeling Ham Revisions: Having identified link spam ed-
its, the complementary ham labels are produced. Desiring
accurate tags and low noise, it is insufficient to treat all non-
spam links as appropriate ones (as done in prior work [41]).
To arrive at ham labels, we consider those links added by
privileged users. Given that we trust such individuals to
label poor additions, by extension, they can be trusted to
apply the same wisdom when adding links. For consistency,
these links are also subjected to the “one link added”, “man-
ual inspection”, and “no bot” filters.
Of the 188,210 links with HTML destinations, 50,108
(26.6%) were added by a user with rollback privileges. Of
these, 4,867 met all criteria for inclusion.
Discussion: Combining the labeled sets, we arrive at a
corpus8 with 5,962 entries: 81.6% ham and 18.4% spam (see
Fig. 1). Given the labeling technique, this does not speak
to the actual prevalence of inappropriate links.
Though just 2.5% of all links collected are in the final cor-
pus, our labeling strategy allows us to arrive at tags with
high confidence. This strategy is an advantageous one be-
cause it: (1) autonomously operates based on implicit ac-
tions, (2) allows a case-by-case interpretation of link spam,
and (3) leverages the experience and knowledge of Wikipedia
experts. Trusting these experts is justified: just one spam
edit (0.09% of spam) was committed by a privileged user.
However, as a consequence of the labeling technique some
7To maintain a human validated set, edits that were undone (or
made) by autonomous bots were removed from analysis.
8Efforts to open-source the corpus are encumbered due to it con-
taining: (1) potentially copyrighted/illegal content, and (2) non-
free data points [3]. Interested parties should contact the authors.
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Figure 2: Top-level domain (URL_TLD)
features cannot be utilized. All ham edits are made by priv-
ileged users, making it biasing to encode how they attained
or wield that status. For example, “user registration status”
and “account age” are two prohibited features that would
otherwise be of interest. Similarly, quantifying diff magni-
tude is inappropriate given the “context criteria.” Such bi-
ases are carefully avoided when developing features in Sec. 5.
Other corpus constraints are less severe, and Sec. 7.1 de-
scribes generalizations so our classifier can score all edits.
5. FEATURE SELECTION
The corpus is used to determine features indicative of link
spam behavior. Space considerations9 prevent a compre-
hensive discussion of all features, which Tab. 1 lists. Such
a diversity of features is needed because of varying spam
strategies [41]. For example, one could use subtle strategies,
in the hopes of having a link become embedded with a long
survival time. Alternatively, an attacker could be aggressive,
attempting to maximize utility until detection.
This write-up concentrates on novel features and those
weighted heavily in the classifier (see Tab. 1). Discussion
closely follows the presentation order of that table. Features
are organized by data source: Wikipedia (Sec. 5.1), the land-
ing site (Sec. 5.2), and third-party services (Sec. 5.3). All
features operate only on information available at the time
an edit was committed (i.e., zero-delay detection [17]).
5.1 Wikipedia-driven
Wikipedia-specific features are our starting point. While
some “metadata” and “article” based signals are inspired by
anti-vandalism work [17, 34], we also develop novel features
capturing properties of link presentation and history.
URL Properties: The URL itself is first scrutinized10.
At median, spam URLs are 1.7× shorter than ham ones
(URL_LEN, Tab. 2), likely because spam links point to do-
mains 30% more often than a specific file (URL_IS_DOMAIN,
Tab. 2). This is intuitive: “main pages” are unlikely to con-
tain encyclopedic information, but can be promotional.
Similarly, Fig. 2 visualizes data about the top-level do-
main utilized (URL_TLD). It is unsurprising to see that *.gov
and *.edu TLDs are well-behaved, given their greater ad-
ministrative governance. Appropriately, *.info domains are
penalized, as these are some of the cheapest domains to reg-
ister and could therefore be used in Sybil attacks [20].
9Our open-source implementation (Sec. 7) allows feature calcula-
tion to be examined at greater depth.
10We consider these to be“wiki”features because they are a matter
of presentation; a single landing site could have multiple URLs.
FEATURE SRC TYP RNK DESCRIPTION
URL_TLD W enum ••• Top-level domain of the URL (e.g., *.com or *.edu)
URL_LEN W num •• Length (in characters) of the URL being added
URL_IS_DOMAIN W bool •• Whether the URL points to a broad domain/folder or specific file
URL_SUBDOMAINS W num •• Quantity of subdomains in the URL (i.e., sub.example.com = 3)
LINK_IS_CITE W bool ••••• Whether the link was added per a special reference/citation format
LINK_PLACEMENT W num ••• Where in the article the link was added (as function of article length)
LINK_TEXT_LEN W num •• Length (in characters) of the hypertext description of added link
LINK_DISCUSSED W bool •• Whether the link/URL is found on the article’s discussion page
ART_TS_CREATION W num ••••• Age of the article to which link was added (i.e., time-since creation)
ART_REPUTATION W,A num •••• Historical, time-decayed measure of vandalism/controversy on article, per [40]
ART_REFERENCES W num •• Quantity of citations/references in the article of link addition
ART_LENGTH W num • Length of the Wikipedia article to which the link was added
ART_POPULARITY_* W num - Article visitors in last t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, 6-months}, per [10]
ART_EDITS_TIME_* W,A num - Article edits committed in last t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, 6-months}
URL_ADDS_TIME_* W,A num - Links to URL added in last t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, 6-months}
DOM_ADDS_TIME_* W,A num - Links to domain added in last t ∈ {hour, day, week,month, 6-months}
URL_REPUTATION W,A num •••• Historical, time-decayed measure of spam-iness for added URL
URL_DIVERSITY W,A num •••• Of all the times the URL has been linked, the % added by the current editor
DOM_REPUTATION W,A num ••• Historical, time-decayed measure of spam-iness for added domain
DOM_DIVERSITY W,A num ••• Of all the times the domain has been linked, the % added by the current editor
META_COMM_LEN W num ••••• Length (in characters) of the revision summary
META_TIME_DAY W num •••• Time-of-day when the link was added (UTC locale)
META_DAY_WEEK W enum • Day-of-week when the link was added (UTC locale)
SITE_PROFANE L num ••• Measure of the prevalence of profane language on the landing site
SITE_NUM_IMGS L num ••• Quantity of images displayed on the landing site
SITE_SIZE L num ••• Size (in bytes) of the textual content on the landing site
SITE_COMPRESS L num ••• Ratio of raw content-size to compressed size; speaks to repetitiveness
SITE_TITLE_LEN L num •• Length of the HTML title, in characters (i.e., <title>. . . </title>)
SITE_NUM_META L num •• Quantity of HTML <meta keywords="w1 , w2, . . . , wn"> on site
SITE_VOCAB_LEN L num •• The average word length of visible textual content on the landing site
SITE_COMMERCIAL L num • Measure of the commercial intent of the landing site
SITE_RELEVANT L,W bool • Whether the landing site is topic-similar to Wikipedia article of addition
ALEXA_BACKLINKS T num ••••• Quantity of incoming links to landing site, per the crawling by [3]
ALEXA_DELTAS T,A num ••••• Meta-feature speaking to site’s historical traffic patterns, per [3]
ALEXA_ADULT T bool •••• Whether or not the URL contains adult content, per [3]
ALEXA_SPEED T num ••• Load time of landing site, as a percentile of all sites, per [3]
ALEXA_AGE T num ••• Time that the landing site has been online, per the crawling by [3]
ALEXA_CONTINENT T enum •• Continent to which the whois registration of site maps, per [3]
GOOG_MALWARE T bool • Whether URL is active on the Safe-Browsing “malware” list, per [5]
GOOG_PHISHING T bool • Whether URL is active on the Safe-Browsing “phishing” list, per [5]
Table 1: Comprehensive listing of features used, organized by data source. Sources are: (W )ikipedia,
(L)anding site, and (T)hird-party. (A)ggregate features are also indicated. Feature rank/importance was
calculated by performing a greedy step-wise comparison over feature subsets [24, 28]. More bullets indicate
greater weight in the final classifier. For brevity, rank is omitted for features having multiple variations.
Link Properties: Link presentation is also of interest.
One heavily weighted feature is if the link is part of a “ci-
tation” environment (LINK_IS_CITE). As Tab. 2 shows, ci-
tations are 6.5× less likely to be spam. This feature also
correlates well with where in the article the link is placed
(LINK_PLACEMENT). By convention, straightforward hyper-
links (i.e., not citations) are confined to an “External Links”
section at the bottom of an article. Even spam links adhere
to this rule – being placed about 3/4 of the way through
the article (Tab. 2). Clearly, spammers are not using promi-
nence to solicit reader (or administrative) attention [41].
Although uncommon, when a link appears on the article’s
“discussion”page before it is posted to the article, it tends to
be constructive (LINK_DISCUSSED, Tab. 2). This is likely an
attempt to reach consensus on if the link should be added.
Article Properties: Focus now shifts to the Wikipedia
articles to which links are added. We find that spam tends
to target more popular (ART_POPULARITY_*, Fig. 3c) and
older (ART_TS_CREATION, Tab. 2) articles than ham links.
This may be an attempt to maximize link exposures, but
could also invite administrative scrutiny.
Similarly, the scatter-plot of Fig. 4 shows that the previous
section’s LINK_PLACEMENT feature correlates strongly with
ART_TS_CREATION. Links that are added: (1) far down the
article, on an (2) old article, have a high spam probability.
This is logical: old articles are likely to have mature/stable
content (links included). While citations (likely to be in the
article body) may be required to update an article, it is far
less likely that general “external links” will be ham.
Moreover, articles which have been problematic in the
past tend to continue that trend. This makes an article rep-
utation metric (ART_REPUTATION, per [42] and its API [40])
particularly relevant. In 43% of spam cases, the article had a
recent history of spam and/or vandalism (vs. 24% for ham).
URL/Domain Aggregates: The Wikipedia history of a
web property (i.e., URL or domain) is one of the best indi-
cators of its quality, capturing intuitions such as:
• Web properties with a spam history are suspicious.
• Unusually rapid linking to a web property is suspicious.
• Little editor diversity for a web property is suspicious.
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Figure 3: CDFs for (a) META_COMM_LENGTH, (b) ALEXA_BACKLINKS, (c) ART_POPULARITY_DAY, and (d) DOM_DIVERSITY
FEATURE UNIT HAM SPAM
URL_LEN chars. 64 38
LINK_PLACEMENT % of article 41 73
LINK_TEXT_LEN chars. 26 24
ART_TS_CREATION months 146 192
URL_IS_DOMAIN boolean 6.3% 37.5%
LINK_IS_CITE boolean 53.9% 8.3%
LINK_DISCUSSED boolean 4.5% 2.4%
Table 2: Wikipedia feature comparison.
Non-boolean features presented at median.
These notions are represented by: (1) raw counts, (2) time-
decayed reputations built atop the rollback action [42], and
(3) user-link diversity quotients. Each of these signals is
calculated over varying time windows to capture historical
trends (see Tab 1). Additionally, each feature is quantified
at both URL and domain granularity11 (again, Tab. 1).
Diversity quotients lend themselves to human interpreta-
tion. For example, Fig. 3d indicates that 40% of spam links
are added by an editor who is responsible for all recent links
to that domain, versus 15% for ham (DOM_DIVERSITY). No
matter the contributor, long-term prevalence is indicative of
link quality: ham domains have 5× the 6-month quantity of
spam ones (DOM_ADDS_TIME_6MOS).
Reputation and raw counts are also strong benchmarks,
but trend discovery requires multi-dimension analysis (easy
for a classifier, but non-trivial to present). Normalization
is an important component of such reasoning: consider that
YouTube averages nearly 2,000 link additions monthly.
Metadata: Entire anti-vandalism systems have been built
atop revision metadata [42], and such features are now eval-
uated in an anti-spam setting. For example, the length
of the revision summary/comment (META_COMM_LEN) is the
second-most heavily weighted feature in the classifier. Some
88% of spam leaves this field blank (versus 17% of ham, see
Fig. 3a). Omitting a summary hints that one is not familiar
with Wikipedia conventions and therefore may be unaware
of the linking rules under which the encyclopedia operates.
Prior work [42] also showed that most vandalism hap-
pens on weekdays (META_DAY_WEEK) during normal “business
hours” (META_TIME_DAY). However, the inability to localize
UTC timestamps using IP-geolocation (registered users’ IPs
are hidden) hampers comparison with that prior result. Re-
gardless, there exists strong temporal patterns separating
spam and ham edits, as Fig. 5 demonstrates.
11Domains capture broad trends which may be able to evade URL-
specific analysis. However, some domains may be too broad (e.g.,
social-networking sites). Future work intends to draw distinctions
at all points along a URL’s domain/folder hierarchy.
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5.2 Landing Site Processing
Inspired by spam webpage detection [19, 31] (regardless of
the delivery mechanism), our classifier implements a landing
site processing component. However, we find the contribu-
tion of these features to be incremental, as the diversity
of inappropriate links added to Wikipedia exceeds that of
“stereotypical” spam. These findings are now summarized.
Language Properties: Foremost, one might expect spam
links to be overwhelming commercial. To quantify this, des-
tination content was run through extensive (1000+ element)
regular expressions capturing marketing terminology. Spam
sites were found to be only marginally more commercial
than ham ones (SITE_COMMERCIAL, Tab. 3), supporting prior
Wikipedia research [41]. In a similar manner, vulgarity was
quantified to mitigate “shock sites” and inappropriateness,
with slightly better results (SITE_PROFANE, Tab. 3).
Literature [19, 31] also describes statistical language prop-
erties typical of spam webpages. To this end, we imple-
mented features for the size (SITE_SIZE), compressibility
(SITE_COMPRESS), and a measure of the vocabulary com-
plexity (SITE_VOCAB_LEN) at the destination. While these
features figure moderately in the classifier (see Tab. 1), the
results sometimes disagree with those in prior research. For
FEATURE UNIT HAM SPAM
SITE_COMMERCIAL ratio 1.00 1.03
SITE_PROFANE ratio 1.00 1.08
SITE_SIZE kilobytes 32.99 27.05
SITE_COMPRESS ratio 3.82 3.97
SITE_VOCAB_LEN chars. 4.21 3.98
SITE_RELEVANT boolean 37.3% 33.8%
Table 3: Landing site feature comparison.
Non-boolean features presented at median.
example, spam content was found to have slightly shorter av-
erage word-lengths than ham (Tab. 3), contrasting with [31].
Other research [29] relies on “language model disagree-
ment”, the notion that spam contributions do not fit the
“context” of the surrounding content. To measure this, a
na¨ıve measure of relevance was constructed: whether the
Wikipedia article title appears verbatim on the landing site
(SITE_RELEVANT). With 37% of ham and 33% meeting this
criteria (Tab. 3), the feature’s weight is nominal. Future
work intends to leverage more rigorous Bayesian and n-gram
probabilities over the entire Wikipedia article. However,
such techniques may scale poorly in a live implementation.
SEO Tactics: Given that a spammer has taken to Wiki-
pedia to publicize a site, one might expect that he/she would
attempt to maximize traffic via other tactics (i.e., search-
engine optimization). Lengthy <meta keywords=". . ."> and
<title> blocks are two simple and common SEO tactics.
Surprisingly, we observe that spam edits have slightly shorter
titles (SITE_TITLE_LEN, 6.8 vs. 7.5 words) and fewer meta
keywords (SITE_NUM_META, 5.3 vs. 6.6 words). This may sug-
gest there is fallacy in assuming the contributor of a spam
link is actually the landing site operator: one could simply
be lobbyist for a particular person or agenda.
5.3 External Data
Next, third-party services are used to discern spam land-
ing sites, namely Alexa Web Information [3] and Google’s
Safe-Browsing project [5, 36]. These well-regarded providers
can perform analysis at a depth and breadth that would oth-
erwise be outside the scope of this work.
Alexa [2, 3]: Alexa is a company producing web-statistics
via Internet usage monitoring and a web crawler. For each
link added, we query their subscription service which pro-
vides data about backlinks, traffic patterns, and site hosting.
The quantity of backlinks (ALEXA_BACKLINKS) a landing
site has, as visualized in Fig. 3b, is the feature weighted most
heavily in our classifier. In the median case, a ham site has
≈850 backlinks, compared to just 20 in the spam case (a
40× difference). This is unsurprising given that backlinks
are recognized as a good measure of site reputation and the
basis for well-known search-engine rank algorithms [32].
Site popularity and traffic trends can also capture rep-
utation. One would expect that sites with a consistently
high number of visitors might be appropriate destinations.
Such notions are captured by ALEXA_DELTAS, a meta-feature
(i.e., lower-order classifier) built from ≈50 data points. Its
final rank (Tab. 1) speaks to its predictive nature. Similarly,
reputable sites are likely to be quick loading (ALEXA_SPEED)
and maintain their Internet presence (ALEXA_AGE). At me-
dian, spam sites are two years younger than ham ones.
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Distinct from reputation, one might consider the genre of
the site content. Alexa indicates adult hosts (ALEXA_ADULT),
and spam sites are 8×more likely to be adult in nature (0.8%
of ham and 6.5% of spam links have this property12). One
can also examine where the site is hosted (ALEXA_CONTINENT,
Fig. 6). Similar to email spam [39], Asia and Europe are
common spam sources. In fact, Asia hosts four times as
many Wikipedia spam destinations (relatively) as ham ones.
Finally, in some cases, Alexa is missing data about a URL,
likely because their crawler has yet to encounter it. Missing
data might suggest a site is new or poorly connected, both
indicative of low quality. Empirical data shows that 26%
of spam links have missing crawler data, compared to 5%
for ham links. However, it is somewhat dubious to leverage
the “shortcomings” of another service. Therefore, our cur-
rent classifier treats such features as “missing”, incurring no
penalty. No feature is codified to formalize this notion.
Google Safe-Browsing [5, 36]: By overlaying machine-
learning and virtual-machine sandboxing atop its Internet
crawler, Google produces lists of suspected malware and
phishing sites (GOOG_MALWARE, GOOG_PHISHING). Ostensibly,
utilizing these lists could prevent Wikipedia from becoming
a vehicle for malware delivery and scamming behaviors.
The entire data collection (of 235,000 links) produced just
31 hits on these lists. None of these links were assigned the
“spam” label for a variety of reasons, and thus the features
are a non-factor in the classifier. Nonetheless, this data point
is still described and collected so we can write static rules
(Sec. 7.2) capable of mitigating future malware attacks, re-
gardless of their status quo prevalence.
6. CLASSIFER PERFORMANCE
Having identified individual features, their performance is
now analyzed in combination. To build the classifier, the
Weka [24] implementation of the alternating decision tree
(ADTree) algorithm [21] is used. ADTree is chosen because
of its: (1) performance, (2) support for enumerated and
missing features (as sometimes occur with third-party data),
and (3) output of a human-readable model. All results were
obtained via 10-fold cross-validation over the corpus.
Simple Performance: Results are summarized by Fig. 7
and Tab. 4. Examining precision-recall (Fig. 7a), it is clear
our method significantly outperforms a control classifier.
While pure chance operates at ≈18% precision (the per-
cent of the corpus which is spam), our system has precision
greater than 90% for 80% of the recall spectrum.
12The fact that not all adult content is spam underscores why
Wikipedia link spam detection is difficult. An adult film star’s
article can legitimately link to his/her “official site”, but in many
other contexts the same link would be grossly inappropriate.
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Figure 7: Result curves for (a) precision-recall, (b) recall vs. false-positive rate, and (c) ROC.
Feature subsets include: (W)ikipedia, (L)anding site, and (T)hird-party (see Tab. 1).
Also of interest is Fig. 7b, which plots recall as a function
of false-positive (FP) rate. In order for the classifier to au-
tonomously block spam contributions, it must adhere to the
FP-tolerances of the community (see Sec. 7.3). Fig. 7b shows
that 64% of spam could be detected at a 0.5% FP-rate, sug-
gesting that a considerable portion of the spam mitigation
burden could be lifted from human patrollers.
Feature Subsets: Fig. 7a and Fig. 7c also visualize the
performance of feature subsets. Most striking is that the
“Wikipedia” class alone is nearly equivalent in performance
to the complete classifier. While it is encouraging to see the
strong contributions of these novel features, it also forces
one to consider the necessity of the other subsets. However,
by the very nature of wikis and collaborative environments,
it is “Wikipedia” features which are most easily manipulated
(see Sec. 8). Therefore, the robustness of the other sets could
prove critical in capturing evasive tactics and play a greater
role when the live implementation (Sec. 7) is retrained.
Given the quantity and strength of “Wikipedia” features,
it is interesting to examine what“sub-subset” is most heavily
weighted. Such groupings are delineated per the organiza-
tion of Sec. 5.1. We find that “metadata” (PR-AUC=0.59)
and “URL/domain aggregates” (PR-AUC=0.66) are most
significant, but neither approaches the composite perfor-
mance of all Wikipedia signals (PR-AUC=0.91, Tab. 4).
This work also implemented features motivated by the
anti-spam efforts of blogs and webpage processing [19, 29,
31]. Of particular interest was how these features, captured
by the “landing site” subset, would fare in a purely collabo-
rative environment. As Fig. 7 shows, this is the worst per-
forming subset by a substantial margin. While discouraging,
it also confirms some of our initial intuition that Wikipedia
spam behaviors are a unique phenomena that require dis-
tinct detection machinery from “typical” spam links.
Finally, Alexa features (the force of the “third-party” sub-
set) perform surprisingly well in isolation, especially consid-
ering that the service is designed as a marketing data service,
not an anti-spam tool.
Performance Discussion: Unfortunately, our technique
performs far less accurately than state-of-the-art email spam
mitigation schemes. However, the system performs compa-
rably to Wikipedia anti-vandalism classifiers [34], a domain
that has received considerable research attention.
There is little doubt the proposed system can help Wiki-
pedia control status quo spamming behaviors, which might
be characterized as a “nuisance.” More significant is its abil-
ity to mitigate aggressive and mechanized tactics that could
lead to pervasive damage. Even in its purest form (i.e., ab-
sent the static rules of Sec. 7.2), we are confident the classi-
fier can deflect the recently proposed attacks of [41]. Static
rules will add an additional level of reassurance.
Throughout this work, evaluation has been performed over
tagged corpus edits, yet these edits compose just 2.5% of
those collected. While definitive and noise-free labels are
advantageous for training, it remains to be seen if the as-
sociated edits capture all the subtleties necessary to make
accurate spam/ham predictions. Certainly, a sizable por-
tion of unlabeled data is rife with ambiguity (regarding its
quality), and it is unlikely even human editors could reach a
definitive spam/ham distinction. In a live implementation,
however, all links must be scored and the non-human nature
of our tool might invite criticism over false-positives.
Improving Performance: While the classifier performs
well, future improvements intend to build on this founda-
tion. Data collection is ongoing to improve corpus scope.
Moreover, a corpus built without labeling bias (Sec. 4.2)
would enable additional features. Recently, [33] assembled a
vandalism corpus using outsourced human annotators, and
a similar configuration is imaginable for anti-spam purposes.
7. LIVE IMPLEMENTATION
Having demonstrated that our classifier significantly out-
performs random search (the status quo patrol technique), it
seemed prudent to encode the technique for the Wikipedia
community. We undertook this task, with an implemen-
tation currently operational on English Wikipedia (open-
source code available at [40]). This required practical consid-
erations outside of those encountered with the oﬄine corpus
(Sec. 7.1) and static rules to handle special circumstances
(Sec. 7.2). Further, the tool provides streamlined access to
the classification scores (Sec. 7.3). Fig. 8 visualizes the sys-
tem model/architecture of this implementation.
7.1 Generalizations
Our corpus was designed with the goal of having accurate
labels, leading to many constraints on the complete set of
edits collected. In practice, however, the classifier should be
able to score all revisions adding an external link(s)13:
Multiple Links: The corpus contains edits where exactly
one link was added. In order to score revisions contributing
multiple links, we begin by processing each link indepen-
dently. Then, the score assigned (to the edit) should be the
13When scoring a link, the classifier outputs a real-value which
speaks to the probability a revision is link spam (not a binary
prediction). Higher scores are more indicative of spam.
FEATURES PR ROC
Random 0.184 0.500
Wikipedia (W) 0.909 0.968
Landing site (L) 0.399 0.738
Third-party (T) 0.656 0.866
Combo (W+L) 0.902 0.965
Combo (W+T) 0.915 0.970
Combo (L+T) 0.667 0.872
All (W+L+T) 0.917 0.971
Table 4: Area-under-curve (AUC)
for precision-recall (PR) and
receiver-operating-characteristic
(ROC), for various feature subsets.
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Figure 8: Architecture for spam detection implementation
maximum of those scores. In this manner, spammers cannot
use constructive links to dilute inappropriate ones.
Non-HTML Destinations: A majority (79%) of desti-
nations are HTML documents, for which there are specific
features. However, other content types can be harnessed
for malicious purposes. To prevent evasion, such additions
are scored without using “landing site” features (at slightly
decreased performance, see Tab. 4).
7.2 Static Rules
Other implementation practicalities are more acute. In
these cases, static scoring rules are installed:
Acquisition Errors: Destinations returning HTTP 4xx or
5xx error codes (e.g.,“404 Not Found”) are scored arbitrarily
high. An inaccessible landing site serves no purpose, speaks
to unreliability, and violates policy [11].
Novel Attack Vectors: Recent work [41] has identified
novel link spam attacks, not yet in active use, and therefore
not trained upon. Static detection rules are authored to pre-
vent widespread damage via these channels. For example,
the Safe-Browsing lists [5, 36] (per Sec. 5.3) are utilized in
such a fashion. Similarly, if novel spam strategies do arise,
the classifier can be retrained to capture them.
7.3 Utilizing Revision Scores
Having quantified a probabilistic link spam metric for re-
visions, these scores need to be applied and disseminated.
One goal is for the system to autonomously undo egre-
gious link additions. Such operation requires Wikipedia ap-
proval, which is being sought as of this writing. Generally, a
false-positive tolerance is set and score thresholds are tuned
accordingly. For example, one anti-vandalism bot [18] op-
erates at a FP-rate of 0.5%. Per Sec. 6 and Fig. 7b, our
system could detect 64% of link spam at such tolerances.
Regardless of the outcome of that approval process, pa-
trollers can use classifier scores to prioritize spam search
efforts (i.e., for intelligent routing). This has already been
achieved by interfacing with STiki [40] – GUI software pro-
viding crowdsourced access to a shared priority queue of re-
visions in need of inspection (see Fig. 8). STiki requires only
that ID/score pairs are provided, as its core engine handles
all backend logic (e.g., de-queuing inspected or non-current
revisions). Critically, the human assessments gathered using
the tool can be used to refine scoring techniques.
Finally, an API and IRC feed have been made available [40]
so other developers can access the calculated features/scores.
8. EVASION & GAMESMANSHIP
Having implemented a link spam classifier/scorer for Wiki-
pedia, we now consider how a user might evade our system.
Given spammer’s well-incentivized nature, such attempts at
gamesmanship are a realistic concern.
First, any attacker who is aware of the model and the in-
tuition on which the system is built has some advantage. An
attacker could manipulate his/her edit or landing site so that
it is scored more favorably. Admittedly, some features can
be easily gamed (e.g., META_COMM_LENGTH, the revision sum-
mary length). Fortunately, others are more robust in that
they, (1) are not easily affected, or (2) increase marginal
costs for attackers. For example, Sec. 5.3 described the
“traffic”(ALEXA_DELTAS) and“backlinks”(ALEXA_BACKLINKS)
features, which are difficult to manipulate. Similarly, using
Sybil attacks [20] to side-step URL and domain reputations
(URL_REPUTATION and DOM_REPUTATION, Sec. 5.1) would re-
quire multiple domain registrations. Such spatio-temporal
signals have been shown difficult to circumvent [26, 42] and
the classifier integrates several features of this kind.
Absent content-optimization against the model, we (non-
exhaustively) consider several other attack vectors:
TOCTTOU attack: A time-of-check-to-time-of-use sat-
tack leverages the fact that scoring is performed only at link
addition. By altering destination content (or using redi-
rection) after this time, one can link to sites that would
otherwise be penalized. Such behavior has already been
seen in active use [12] against human patrollers. An obvious
solution is to re-scan sites on some interval and report on
significant scoring changes. This, of course, would require
substantial resources (English Wikipedia currently has some
36 million external links). Scalability could be increased by
producing a whitelist of domains that are trusted to have
stable content.
Crawler redirection: Similar to a TOCTTOU attack, an
attacker could serve benign content to our crawler, but serve
spam content to ordinary visitors. Detecting the IP address
from which our service operates would be straightforward.
One solution is to distribute the fetch operation, possibly
using anonymization networks. Ultimately, such landing site
manipulation is a reason we implemented orthogonal feature
types (i.e., wiki-centric and third-party data).
Denial-of-service: By overwhelming the service with re-
quests (i.e., link additions to Wikipedia) an attacker could
delay the processing of subsequent link spams. In addition to
parallel analysis, our system uses static rules to handle un-
reasonably large landing sites and edits adding many links.
9. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have described the problem of purely
collaborative link spam and justified the need for its au-
tonomous detection. To this end, we proposed a mitigation
strategy and evaluated it over Wikipedia revisions.
From the outset we suspected that purely collaborative
environments (e.g., wikis) were unique from partially col-
laborative ones (e.g., blogs) and might require specialized
anti-spam machinery. This was confirmed by implementing
features inspired by past blog/forum research, finding their
performance nominal. These shortcomings, however, were
overcome by leveraging properties specific to wiki environ-
ments. When combined with third-party data, features built
on these properties produce an effective and robust classifier.
It is clear this work will benefit the Wikipedia community,
especially given our live implementation of the technique.
Oﬄine analysis demonstrated that two-thirds of Wikipedia
link spam can be automatically mitigated (at low false pos-
itives), while prioritizing the remainder for human inspec-
tion. This is a considerable improvement over current strate-
gies, which rely on brute-force human effort.
However, this work also intends to have broader impli-
cations. Our extensive feature set captures properties that
exist in general-purpose wikis, not simply those specific to
encyclopedic content. Moreover, a performance baseline has
been established on which future work can build. Ulti-
mately, we hope our technique is a foundation towards better
securing the entire collaborative paradigm.
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